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a b s t r a C t 
Kenneth Gergen is one of the most widely known contributors to social 
constructionist thought in the world today. Since the publication of his pa-
per “Social Psychology as History” he has become a central player in what 
is known as the Social Psychology Crisis. In his academic career, and from 
what he has called ‘Relational Theory’, Gergen has revisited a significant 
number of psychological constructs and has proposed various dialogical 
and collaborative practices in therapy, organizational development, 
education, community development, social work and peace-building, 
among other things. This paper is a conversation with Gergen in which 
together we explore the particular way in which he understands the 
social constructionist movement. It is also a conversation about re-
lational theory and related practices.
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r e s u m e n
Kenneth Gergen es, actualmente, uno de los promotores más ampliamente 
conocidos del pensamiento socioconstruccionista. Desde la publicación de 
su artículo “Social Psychology as History” ha ocupado un lugar central en 
lo que se conoce como la crisis de la Psicología Social. En su carrera académi-
ca y desde lo que él ha llamado Teoría Relacional, Gergen ha revisado un 
número importante de constructos psicológicos y ha propuesto varias prác-
ticas dialógicas y colaborativas en psicoterapia, desarrollo organizacional, 
educación, desarrollo comunitario, trabajo social y procesos de paz, entre 
otros campos. Este artículo es una conversación con Gergen en la cual se 
exploró conjuntamente su manera particular de entender el movimiento del 
construccionismo social. También es una conversación acerca de la teoría 
relacional y de las prácticas relacionales. 
Palabras clave autores:
Kenneth Gergen, construccionismo social, teoría relacional, prácticas relacionales, 
ser relacional.
SICI: 1657-9267(201209)11:3<1001:SCRCKG>2.0.TX;2-I
  Para citar este artículo: Aceros, J. C. (2012). Social 
construction and relationalism: A conversation 
with Kenneth Gergen. Universitas Psychologica, 
11(3), 1001-1011.
*   Interview acknowledgments: The author wishes to 
express his gratitude to Ken Gergen for his open and 
friendly willingness to participate in the interview, 
as well as for reviewing various drafts of this paper. 
Special thanks go to Lupicinio Iñiguez for the 
information and photographic material provided 
in the process of elaborating the interview. The 
author also wishes to thank Facebook group ‘Con-
struccionismo Social’ for the questions offered for 
the interview. Finally, a special thank you to Mary 
Gergen and Natalia Evnitskaya for reviewing the 
text. 
**  Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Facultat 
de Psicologia, Departament de Psicologia Social, 
Despatx B5/048. C.P. 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola 
del Vallès), España. Telephone: 93 581 2353. E-mail: 
juancarlos.aceros@uab.catJuan C. aCeros
1002         Universitas Psychologica       v. 11       no. 3       jUlio-sePtiemBre       2012   
On a shelf full of books and magazines at the 
Department of Social Psychology at the Univer-
sitat Autònoma de Barcelona, three gray figures 
of dragons with open jaws and sharp teeth can be 
distinguished. They represent relativism, postmod-
ernism and constructionism: three protagonists 
of the so-called Social Psychology Crisis11. Their 
disturbing presence in our daily lives is due to the 
initiative of Susan Condor and Stephen Reicher, 
who brought them for a small group meeting on 
‘Critical Social Psychology’ (see, Ibáñez & Íñiguez, 
1997) in Barcelona (Spain) in 1993. Nearly two 
decades after the arrival of these dragons at the 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, their mean-
ing continues to permeate the work of the social 
psychologists trained there.
In the following pages, with the help of one of 
the major players involved in the Social Psychol-
ogy Crisis, we will approach one of these beasts of 
critical social psychology: social constructionism. 
This term was coined in the sociology of knowledge 
by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and during the 
1970s and 1980s it played an important role in the 
‘linguistic turn’ in social sciences.2 Today, instead 
of referring to a unified school, the term ‘social 
constructionism’ is used to indentify the work of 
a vast variety of authors concerned with cultural, 
historical, socio-linguistic and context-dependent 
meaning-making processes. Trying to define what 
social constructionists have in common, Lock and 
Strong (2010) describe them as researchers who ‘are 
interested in delineating the processes that operate 
in the socio-cultural conduct of action to produce 
the discourses within which people construe them-
1  During the 1970’s, an era of unrest interrupted the apparent 
consensus prevailing in social psychology. Two papers (Israel & 
Tajfel, 1972; Gergen, 1973) inaugurated a period of debate around 
the individualistic and experimental approaches, and universal-
izing assumptions in the social sciences. This period is known as 
‘the Social Psychology Crisis’ (see, Ibáñez & Íñiguez, 1997). 
2  The term ‘linguistic turn’, which was popular in the 1970s and 
1980s, refers to a turning point that took place in philosophy and 
the social sciences, whose background should be traced back to 
the rise of modern linguistics and analytic philosophy. Initially, 
the term ‘linguistic turn’ meant an increase in the importance of 
language research, but it also led to a redefinition of communica-
tive processes and meaning-making processes. For a review, see 
Ibáñez (2006).
selves’ (p. 8) and within which our sense of reality 
becomes possible.
Among those who have contributed to the de-
velopment and popularization of social construc-
tionism are authors such as Jonathan Potter, John 
Shotter, Rom Harré and Kenneth Gergen. Among 
them, the last one is the best known in the field of 
psychology (Hibberd, 2005). Initially committed 
to discovering the laws of human social behavior 
through the experimental method, Gergen started 
his academic career in 1963 as Assistant Professor of 
Social Psychology at Harvard University. There, he 
also participated in activities carried out in the De-
partment of Social Relations, which embraced the 
efforts of psychologists, sociologists and anthropolo-
gists in various teaching assignments. Surrounded by 
a rich academic and social context, Gergen began to 
feel dissatisfied with the discipline in which he was 
trained. Some private doubts about experimental 
social psychology began to emerge in him.
 Gergen was asked “Where do you come from?” 
in an interview about his professional background 
by Mony Elkaïm in 1996. “Let’s say that, in pro-
fessional terms,” he responded, “I was trained in 
experimental social psychology (...) Over the years, 
however, I have been examining the hopes and 
aspirations of this field with increasing disappoint-
ment. (...) On the one hand, they did not allow me 
to give any meaning to my life and, on the other, 
I was struck by the inherent transience of most 
of the phenomena we are faced with” (p. 12, our 
translation).3
Kenneth Gergen was given a teaching posi-
tion at the Department of Psychology at Swarth-
more College in Pennsylvania in 1967. During his 
first years in that institution, he published several 
papers on conformity, personal consistency, self-
3  In the original text in French this reads: “Disons que, d’un point 
de vue professionnel, j’ai été formé à la psychologie sociale expéri-
mentale (…). Au fil des années, cependant, j’ai regardé les espoirs 
et les aspirations de ce champ avec une désillusion croissante. Par 
exemple, il m’est apparu assez vite que les théories et les méthodes 
de cette approche étaient fondamentalement problématiques, en 
cela qu’elles ne me permettaient même pas de donner un sens à 
ma propre vie, et le caractère intrinsèquement transitoire de la 
plupart des phénomènes auxquels nous étions confrontés me 
frappait aussi”.Social conStruction and relationaliSm: a converSation with Kenneth GerGen
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presentation, personality and social interaction, 
social comparison, social attraction, and pro-social 
behavior, among other issues. In 1973 his career 
took a turn with the publication of “Social Psychol-
ogy as History” in which he expressed his doubts 
about experimental research as a neutral reading 
of human social behavior and presented it instead 
as a form of social influence. The ideas articulated 
there gave rise to heated controversies which subse-
quently turned Gergen into one of the compulsory 
references of Critical Social Psychology and the 
protagonist of what he called ‘The Social Construc-
tionist Movement in Modern Psychology’ in 1985.
According to Gergen (1985), social construc-
tionism, is an approach that is “concerned with 
explicating the processes by which people come 
to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the 
world (including themselves) in which they live. 
It attempts to articulate common forms of under-
standing as they now exist, as they have existed 
in prior historical periods, and as they might exist 
should creative attention be so directed” (p. 267). 
As he has said more recently, constructionism is 
not about establishing a ‘foundational theory of 
knowledge’, but rather about opening up an “anti-
foundational dialogue’ in which the emphasis is ‘on 
the social-discursive matrix from which knowledge 
claims emerge and from which their justification is 
derived; the values/ideology implicit within knowl-
edge posits; the modes of informal and institutional 
life sustained and replenished by ontological and 
epistemological commitments; and the distribu-
tion of power and privilege favoured by disciplinary 
beliefs” (Gergen, 1996, p. 77).
For Gergen, constructionism is basically a dia-
logue, i.e., a meaningful exchange between speak-
ers, a social event, a co-active process. Doing social 
constructionism basically means talking: talking 
from and with certain convictions, hopes and val-
ues. This interview is part of such conversation: it 
asks Gergen about his encounters with his critics 
and fans, with authors from different disciplines, 
and with the public in general. It recalls some of 
the debates in which he participated and poses 
questions about the encounters between social 
constructionism and Spanish-speaking academic 
traditions, and it is in itself a dialogue. The follow-
ing text is divided into three sections. The first one 
takes a predominantly biographical approach and 
presents Gergen to readers who are unfamiliar with 
his work. The second section raises some questions 
about the author’s particular way of understanding 
the social constructionism, which he calls ‘Rela-
tional Theory’. The last section deals with the ‘re-
lational practices’ that have gradually become one 
of Gergen’s main concerns. These practices have 
recently transformed him into a tireless innovator 
in different fields of applied psychology.
Gergen and the Social 
Constructionist Movement
JCA: I would like to start this interview by focus-
ing on your personal history, and especially on 
historical events in which you participated. Sev-
eral decades ago, you proposed the idea that social 
psychology is a form of historical inquiry (Gergen, 
1973). According to your arguments, theories of 
social behavior are historical undertakings. They 
are transient accounts of contemporary history. 
Furthermore, they are a form of history-making 
since such theories modify the patterns of behavior 
that they intend to describe and explain. With this 
Figure 1. Kenneth Gergen on the occasion of his last visit to the 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in 2007. Copyright 2007 
by Juan C. Aceros.Juan C. aCeros
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in mind, I would like to ask you the following: Do 
you think constructionism emerged to account for 
ongoing social events during the seventies? And, in 
what sense might we say that social constructionism 
has made history? 
KJG: I do think the seeds for constructionism 
were planted during the events of the seventies, 
but I don’t really think constructionism emerged 
as a means of accounting for these events. The 
thesis of the Social Psychology as History article 
could be viewed as a first step toward construc-
tionism. That article did challenge several cen-
tral presumptions in the empiricist philosophy of 
science from which the field drew its rationale. 
These included: first, the presumption of a cu-
mulative or progressive science; second, the inde-
pendence of the observer and the observed; and 
third, the value neutrality of science. However, 
at the time, I couldn’t really see a clear alterna-
tive to empiricism. It was partly the avalanche of 
criticism provoked by the Psychology as History 
piece that inspired a search for ways to sharpen 
my arguments, And I didn’t have far to look. The 
‘events of the seventies’ had incited a widespread 
critique of status quo modernism, and implied in 
much of that critique - especially in the history of 
science, literary theory and critical theory - were 
arguments that could be assimilated into what 
would become the basis of a social constructionist 
alternative to empiricism. 
Has constructionism ‘made history’? There are 
certainly many ways in which this question can 
be answered affirmatively. Constructionist ideas 
now circulate widely across the social sciences 
and humanities, and even in some corners of the 
natural sciences and theology. This circulation is 
also global. Contrary to positivism - in which only 
‘empirically justified’ accounts are honored - con-
structionist ideas invite all cultures to the table of 
deliberation. There is also the tremendous impact 
that constructionist ideas have had on various 
professional practices - in therapy, organizational 
development, education, community development, 
social work, peace-building, and the like. Modern-
ism remains dominant, but the signs of transforma-
tion are everywhere. 
JCA: The publication of “Social Psychology as 
History” was followed by a series of critical replies 
and even attacks on your work. Lock and Strong 
(2010) have described these replies as vociferous 
and personal, but at the same time highlighted your 
openness to dialogue. This openness would not be 
shown by your critics. In 1985, when you published 
The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern 
Psychology, you still anticipated a strong resistance 
against constructionist thought within the field of 
psychology. Resistance that you probably face quite 
often. Can you tell us a bit more about your attempts 
to have fruitful exchanges with those of your col-
leagues who have opposed your proposals? How 
receptive to constructive discussions about con-
structionism have mainstream psychologists been? 
KJG: Constructive discussions with main-
stream psychologists in the U.S. have been the 
most difficult, and here I would make a contrast 
with discussions in virtually the entire remainder 
of the world. There are many reasons for this. I 
think American culture in general is less intellec-
tually oriented, with psychologists, much like the 
business community, simply wishing to get on with 
productive work (production). Deliberating about 
what one is doing is viewed as wasted time. Then 
there is the deep institutional entrenchment of 
positivism –with grant funds, journal publications, 
and advancement in the field, all tied to publish-
ing experimental data. If this enterprise loses its 
rationale, so does the scientist lose direction, and 
indeed, his or her basis of self-respect.
There is also the problematic way in which con-
structionist arguments have often been put, and 
here I am guilty as well. Too often they are launched 
as a kind of annihilating critique, a critique that 
also takes on the demeanor of superiority, as if ‘we 
know; and you are ignorant.’  This form of the cri-
tique is really unfortunate, because it automatically 
puts the target on defense –as opposed to opening 
a space for mutual exchange. But in my opinion it 
also undermines one of the most important aspects 
of constructionist thought, namely, that there is no 
true or objective match between words and what-
ever exists. Thus, a constructionist does not oc-
cupy any kind of moral or ontological high ground Social conStruction and relationaliSm: a converSation with Kenneth GerGen
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from which to claim superiority. What’s invited is 
a kind of humility, a recognition that ‘we are all in 
this life together’ and, if we wish to survive, or we 
have hopes for a better future, we need to work it 
out together. 
JCA: One of the achievements of social con-
structionism is, without a doubt, the way it has 
spread throughout the world. Indeed, social con-
structionist ideas have been well received in many 
countries. So now I would like to ask you about the 
effect of your ideas in the Spanish-speaking coun-
tries, and I will begin by asking you about your con-
tact with Spain. As a member of the Department 
of Social Psychology at the Universitat Autònoma 
de Barcelona (UAB), I know about your proximity 
to its doctoral studies program. Could you tell us 
a bit about this link? Specifically, could you tell us 
about your relationship with Tomás Ibañez, a great 
promoter of social constructionism in Spain? 
KJG: I am deeply indebted to Tomás Ibáñez 
and have treasured his friendship. He had indepen-
dently been engaged in a critique of empiricist social 
psychology, and I think he found support in my early 
writings for the directions he was pursuing. He was 
responsible for several of my visits to Spain and to 
UAB, and those times together are very special to 
me. Tomás is a brilliant and sophisticated scholar, 
and the kinds of questions he put to me, and the 
opinions he shared, were invariably insightful and 
growth-producing. I also admired so much the way 
in which he nurtured and inspired the younger 
generation of students around him. He was dedi-
cated to their well-being and to seeing them into 
productive careers. For me, he was a model. There 
was a kind and gentle quality to Tomás that drew 
me –and many others– to him, and yet a tough and 
politically engaged intellect that was unswerving. 
He is a treasure.
JCA: The members of the Department of Social 
Psychology at the UAB have many fond memo-
ries of your visits. For example, Lupicinio Íñiguez, 
during a conversation that I had with him about 
this interview, referred to one such memory: your 
discussion with an American philosopher, John 
Searle, in a conference held in Gerona, Spain. In 
your book Relational Being (Gergen, 2009, p. 170) 
you describe the experience in some detail, so I will 
not ask you to do it here. However, I refer to this 
episode because it seems to represent clearly your 
academic work at the time. Lupicinio remembers 
that encounter as a clash between relativism and 
realism. Would you agree with this interpretation 
of what happened?
KJG: That is quite a reasonable interpretation, 
given Searle’s other writings. In his early work on 
speech acts and intentionality he writes both as a 
realist and a dualist. In his 1995 book on the social 
construction of reality (written just after the Gero-
na meeting) he makes a strong distinction between 
institutional facts (socially constructed) and brute 
facts. The latter presumably exist independently 
of human interpretation. So, clearly, what seemed 
like ontological relativism to him was the enemy.   
Actually, my way of thinking about social construc-
tion is not ontologically relative. Rather, for me, 
constructionism remains ontologically mute. We 
cannot give an account of what really exists outside 
of one or another perspective or linguistic tradition. 
However, the intensity of that exchange was not 
simply intellectual. Searle is notorious for his bul-
lying ways of engaging in dialogue. It’s as if he loves 
nothing more than a good fight, and he will use 
Figure 2. Kenneth Gergen and professors from the De-
partment of Social Psychology at the Universitat Autòno-
ma de Barcelona in 2006. Copyright 2006 by Lupicino 
Iñiguez. Reprinted with permission.
From left to right: Josep María Blanch, Miquel Domènech, 
Teresa Cabruja, Juan Muñoz, Agnés Vayreda, Lupicinio Íñi-
guez, Kenneth Gergen, Mary Gergen, and Tomás Ibáñez.Juan C. aCeros
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every rhetorical trick in the book to subdue what 
he seems to define as his enemies. Such exchanges 
are not particularly illuminating, and, in my view, 
they demean the tradition of intellectual exchange. 
Rather than mutual searching and deliberation we 
have mutual annihilation.
JCA: You recently made your first visit to Co-
lombia, where you presented the ideas you had de-
veloped in Relational Being. As you told me on some 
other occasion, constructionist ideas are very much 
alive there and new creative practices are emerg-
ing. On the other hand, in Construccionismo social: 
aportes para el debate y la práctica [Social Construc-
tionism: Contributions to the Debate and Practice], 
Estrada and Diazgranados (2007) assert that your 
work has impacted, in one way or another, Latin 
American researchers such as Ignacio Martín-Baró, 
Maritza Montero, Carlos Martín-Beristain, Elina 
Dabas, Marcelo Pakman, Carlos Sluzki and Dora 
Schnitmann. What can you say about the past and 
the present of the contact of your ideas with the 
Latin American reality?
KJG: I appreciate enormously the way in which 
scholars and practitioners in Latin America have 
not only engaged with constructionist ideas, but 
have found such impressive and creative ways to 
expand and enrich the dialogues. I never cease to 
learn from my interchanges with my Latin Ameri-
can colleagues.  I am also deeply indebted to col-
leagues in Latin America who have found ways 
of bringing me to their countries. I have learned 
so much from these visits, and most importantly 
perhaps, enduring friendships have developed. 
Moreover, many of these relationships have resulted 
in a number of useful projects, including a PhD 
program, an international network of Spanish-
speaking scholars and practitioners, several books, 
certificate programs, and new organizations built 
around constructionist ideas and practices.
Poetic Activism and Relational Theory
JCA: In a number of your texts you make reference 
to what you do, your academic career and your role 
in the constructionist movement, participating in 
conversations about issues such as truth, reality, 
knowledge, meaning, emotions or the self. The use 
of many traditions in philosophy, the humanities 
and social research has been a way for you to open 
up spaces for those dialogues. On the other hand, 
in your work we can also appreciate a second form 
of conversation: an effort to bring constructionism 
to the general public. You are really interested in 
constructionist ‘conversations’ that could be done 
on the streets, and not only in classrooms, confer-
ences and scientific publications. Is that your way 
of doing what you once called (Gergen, 1997) ‘po-
etic activism?’ That is, are you trying in this way 
to enable a psychology capable of increasing the 
discourse resources of the culture and thus encour-
aging positive transformations of society?
KJG: This attempt to break down the barrier 
between the scholarly community and the general 
public has been important to me for a long time. 
Constructionist ideas have been central to this at-
tempt. This is partly because when you abandon 
the traditional notion that scientific disciplines 
generate pure or generalized knowledge, then you 
have to ask what the sciences do indeed offer to the 
world. This is an acute problem for the social sci-
ences because they participate most directly in the 
meaning-making process within the culture more 
generally. So, if the facts generated in the social sci-
ences are not often very important in themselves, 
then you begin to ask how social science can work 
to participate productively within the culture. And 
you are right, one of the ways I saw this potential 
was through what I called ‘poetic activism’, offering 
the culture forms of discourse that could enrich, 
empower, and enable. 
However, my thinking on this has expanded 
since the 1997 work, and particularly in moving 
beyond discourse as the major offering. I currently 
think about this in terms of our participating with 
the culture in generating what you might call forms 
of life. Here action-research would be one major ex-
ample in which we work with small groups to bring 
about social change. However, we can also bring our 
theoretical sensitivities into conversations in such 
a way that new practices emerge. The creation of 
appreciative inquiry4 would be a good example. It is 
4   See, Cooperrider, Sorensen, Whitney, & Yaeger (2000). Social conStruction and relationaliSm: a converSation with Kenneth GerGen
   Universitas Psychologica       v. 11       no. 3       jUlio-sePtiemBre       2012         1007 
also here that my work with the Taos Institute has 
become central to my life. You might take a look at 
the Taos website (www.taosinstitute.net) to appreci-
ate the range of activities in which we are involved. 
Here it is all about linking social science and soci-
etal practice in such a way that both are enriched. 
JCA: Some authors close to the social studies 
of science, particularly Bruno Latour, argue that 
science is ‘politics by other means’. This idea seems 
to match well with your way of doing psychology. 
Specifically, in your attitude towards the ideology 
of individualism. Your texts directly attack indi-
vidualism and denounce its pernicious effects. In 
addition, you propose an alternative theory called 
Relational Theory. Therefore, I would like to ask 
what this theory is and what it means in the context 
of the traditional debate between individualism and 
communitarianism. To clarify what you mean by re-
lational theory, I think it is important to understand 
what you mean by ‘relationship’. This word has many 
meanings. Even links that are not strictly social 
could be relationships. Consequently, this word is 
difficult to define. You have used terms like ‘micro-
social pattern’ (Gergen, 1994) or ‘co-action’ (Gergen, 
2009) to try to define your way of understanding 
relationships (which, I believe, is very close to Erv-
ing Goffman and Harold Garfinkel’s perspectives). 
Furthermore, you have used various metaphors 
(such as ‘conversation’ or ‘dance’) with which you 
have attempted to provide a less formal and more 
embodied understanding of relationships. Could 
you summarize now what ‘relationships’ means in 
relational theory? 
KJG: That’s a very nice question, primarily 
because what I mean by ‘relational’ is radically 
different from the common understanding of 
the term. As the term ‘relationship’ is typically 
understood, it is the coming together of two fun-
damentally separate entities. Usually we mean 
the coming together of two or more fundamen-
tally separate individuals. And, when they have 
formed a relationship, this too becomes an entity. 
Thus, for communitarians, for example, the com-
munity is the entity. What I attempt to do is to 
challenge the notion of entities, and to propose 
that there is a relational process that stands prior 
to the concept of entities. As a constructionist, 
for example, one can say that the world of enti-
ties is a constructed world. If so, then what is the 
process out of which these constructions emerge? 
Let us take ordinary conversation as one of these 
processes. In our conversation we can construct 
each other as separate entities, or not, so entities 
are not foundational. So let’s begin to look at the 
process of conversation as one of coordinated or 
collaborative action (co-action). When I say some-
thing, and you are not paying attention, I have 
essentially said nothing - a meaningless action. 
When you respond, however, you inject meaning 
into what I have said. So my meaning is not mine; 
it really depends on the coordinated action that 
follows. However, the action that follows is also 
without any meaning, unless I have said some-
thing.  Thus, your meaning is not yours without 
me. In effect, in the process of coordination we 
are co-constituting everything we subsequently 
take to be real, rational, or good. 
JCA: From the relational perspective that you 
propose, you have carried out a new reading of a sig-
nificant number of psychological constructs. In this 
sense, you have cast doubt on the purely subjective 
nature of emotions, creativity, reason, etc. You have 
also thoroughly examined the issue of identity and 
self. In relation to that, many of your works could be 
mentioned. In Realities and Relationships (Gergen, 
1994), for example, you present self-concept as a set 
of narratives and discourses on the self, what you 
call ‘self-narratives’. In The Saturated Self (Gergen, 
1991), you take a tour through the romantic, mod-
ern and post-modern self-related discourses and 
present the image of a contemporary self facing 
a growing number of social stimuli. In your latest 
book (Gergen, 2009), however, you decide to aban-
don the self as the object of your concern and, in-
stead, use the concept of ‘relational being’. I cannot 
help thinking that this is an important theoretical 
effort with which you expect to downplay the indi-
vidual as the locus of identity. What do you expect 
to accomplish with this effort? Why is it necessary 
for relationalism to abandon the ‘saturated self’ and 
opt for the ‘multi-being’?Juan C. aCeros
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 KJG: As I see it, the move from the saturated 
self to relational being is not so much an abandon-
ment as an extension. Yes, in the The Saturated 
Self I did say a great deal about our immersion in 
an ever-expanding array of social stimuli, as you 
put it. However, I also described the way in which 
we are called upon to play a far greater –and often 
incoherent– range of roles as we interact within 
an increasing and ever-more complex arena rela-
tionship. Or, you might say, we come to realize, 
in a way that we never quite understood in the 
culture of low technology, that what we call the 
self is inherently part of social process. Now, in Re-
lational Being, I take this a step further. I propose 
that this process is a logical stage prior to the very 
idea of an individual self. This is not to say that 
we are determined by the process, because we are 
indeed part of it. The very idea of cause and effect 
becomes obsolete, as does the long-problematic 
distinctions between person and group, self and 
other, self and society.
 JCA: Talking about your writings on the self, 
Lock and Strong (2010) conclude: “(…) anchoring 
ourselves in particular stories or descriptions of the 
self can constrain our resourceful and collaborative 
ways of interacting with others” (p. 303). The au-
thors fall on your constant invitation to creativity, 
the construction of new self-related vocabulary, and 
new and varied ways of being a self. This invitation 
is no less provocative, especially for psychothera-
pists, but it faces what might be considered practical 
limitations which are beyond the linguistic scope. 
In this sense I remember Zygmunt Bauman, who in 
an interview with Benedetto Vecchi says that “after 
all, asking ‘who you are’ makes sense to you only 
once you believe that you can be someone other 
than you are; only if you have a choice, and only if 
it depends on you what you choose; only if you have 
to do something, that is, for the choice to be ‘real’ 
and to hold. But this is precisely what did not occur 
to the residents of the backwater villages and forest 
settlements –who never had a chance to think of 
moving places, let alone to seek, discover or invent 
something as nebulous (indeed, as unthinkable) as 
‘another identity.’” (Bauman & Vecchi, 2004, pp. 
47-48) What could you tell us about these limita-
tions Bauman finds in our ability to freely and 
dynamically reconstitute our identity?
KJG: I pretty much agree with Bauman’s pro-
posal here, but would simply add that the idea of 
‘moving places’ geographically is rapidly becoming 
obsolete. Instead we can talk in terms of the tech-
nological world described in The Saturated Self, in 
which multiple worlds, often compelling or attrac-
tive, are available to us –simply at the flick of a 
television remote or pressing the ‘return’ button on 
one’s computer or mobile phone. There is one sig-
nificant difference between Bauman’s view and my 
own, concerning the increasing liquidity of being. 
Whereas Bauman, for example, in his book Liquid 
Love, still focuses on the uprooted individual and 
his or her skills in negotiating between freedom and 
security, I tend now to focus on relational process. 
JCA: In an interview that Mony Elkaim had 
with you in 1996 and which he later published in 
the journal Résonances, you were speaking about 
the ‘disappointment’ that experimental social psy-
chology produced in you. So, drawing from the 
word you chose, it could be said that the discipline 
did not respond to what you had imagined about 
it, or did not fulfill your expectations. However, 
such an interpretation implies the assumption that 
Kenneth Gergen is what you call a ‘self-contained 
entity’ whose words are a manifestation of his pri-
vate inner-self. Reading the word ‘disappointment’ 
from an individualistic position would contradict 
what you have advocated throughout your career: 
when we talk about our emotions and feelings, we 
do not express our subjectivity, but we do rather 
form relationships. How then could we compre-
hend your disappointment with social psychology 
from a perspective that would be more faithful to 
constructionism? 
KJG: First of all, you have to distinguish here 
between constructionism as a meta-theory on the 
one hand and as a working vocabulary for carrying 
on everyday life on the other. As a meta-theory –or 
a general orientation to knowledge claims of any 
kind– constructionism neither asserts nor denies 
any particular way of accounting for the world. 
Thus, from this meta-theoretical standpoint, in-
dividualist discourse is as legitimate as any other. Social conStruction and relationaliSm: a converSation with Kenneth GerGen
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Thus, I may use individualist talk from time to time; 
one cannot participate in cultural life in the West 
without it. This does not mean that I hold it to be 
true, but it is a useful way to participate in ongo-
ing relations of value. However, as a vocabulary for 
everyday life, I have made a lot of arguments –both 
conceptual and ideological– against individualism 
and psychologism, and attempted to generate a re-
lational alternative. This alternative is most fully 
developed in my book Relational Being: Beyond Self 
and Community. I am not sure you want to go into it 
here, but in this work I try to show how psychologi-
cal discourse can be viewed as socially performative. 
Thus, to speak of my disappointment is not to give 
a report on an event in the mind, but to engage in 
a relational action. I don’t have disappointment ‘in 
here,’ so much as I am doing disappointment as an 
action that is intelligible and functional within a 
cultural tradition. 
JCA: Despite your interest in exploring more 
social or relational accounts of identity, the con-
cept of ‘collective identity’ does not appear in your 
writings. This concept has been particularly useful 
in fields such as research on collective action and 
social movements. One of the authors who have 
contributed to make it a major topic has been, with-
out doubt, the Italian psychologist Alberto Melucci. 
In his work we can find a certain ‘constructionist’ 
accent when he argues that collective identity is 
‘constructed’ and ‘negotiated’ through ‘activation of 
social relationships’. In Challenging Codes (Melucci, 
1996), he states: “Movements are systems of action, 
complex networks among the different levels and 
meanings of social action. Collective identity allow-
ing them to become actors is not a datum or an es-
sence; it is the outcome of exchanges, negotiations, 
decisions, and conflicts among actors” (p. 4). From 
your point of view, could the concept of ‘collective 
identity’, in the way Melucci uses it, have some util-
ity for the relationalist approach to identity? 
KJG: You are right to see the congenial ‘accent’, 
as there is considerable agreement in our emphasis 
on the ‘interactive process’ through which mean-
ing is constructed. My reading of Melucci is that 
he wants to find a way of writing about the kind of 
identity one comes to acquire through participation 
in social movements. ‘Collective identity’ is a useful 
concept for this purpose. Where I see Melucci and I 
differing, however, is in what I see as a Durkheimian 
(or macro-sociological) legacy in his work, where 
he wants to talk about ‘groups’ and larger ‘systems’ 
as having a reality sui generis.
Relational Practices
JCA: When the possibility of conducting this in-
terview appeared, I found it interesting to address 
your readers in the search for interesting questions 
to ask you. One of the places I turned to in the 
quest for these readers and these questions was the 
Internet. There are different sites on the web where 
constructionist-minded people discuss your ideas 
and share resources related to your work. In one 
such sites, namely, a Facebook group that brings to-
gether psychology students and psychologists from 
Latin America and Spain, I asked these cybernauts 
about the questions they would like to ask you. To 
start talking about what you call ‘relational prac-
tices’, I would like to retrieve one of them. Some of 
those who responded to my request are interested in 
relationalism-based strategies to carry out scientific 
research. Mary Gergen (2001) has expressed her 
concern for a feminist psychology based on collab-
orative and inclusive knowledge-making practices 
that she calls relational science. You, on the other 
hand, have expressed your proximity to narrative 
inquiry and action research (Gergen, 2009). Could 
you briefly explain for us how a relationalist does 
his research?
KJG: The fundamental concern for champion-
ing research practices that are relational has to do 
with the impact of one’s practices on the range of 
relationships. I am not chiefly concerned with any 
particular method or practice of inquiry so much 
as the relational matrix within which it takes place. 
Thus, for example, experimental methods may be 
able to accomplish certain ends, but in a relational 
sense they are deeply problematic. They treat the 
‘subjects’ as aliens to whom they will not reveal their 
intent, and who can be manipulated at will. Fur-
ther, the results of such work are seldom discussed 
with the subjects themselves, or for that matter, Juan C. aCeros
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And, the model of knowledge that is shared in aca-
demic courses is one that says our best knowledge 
of other persons is the result of distancing ourselves 
from them and manipulating them. In effect, the 
relational implications are inimical to our future 
well-being. Narrative research is far better in terms 
of its relational implications and action research 
typically superior to narrative research in this re-
spect. But in what other ways could we carry out 
inquiry that would be even more beneficial to the 
broader sea of relationships in which we exist? Here 
lie exciting challenges to innovation.
JCA: As you have commented in several of your 
works (e.g. Gergen, 1994, 2009), the beginning of 
your career has been characterized predominantly 
by a task that could be called ‘critical’ to psychol-
ogy. In this effort you have been accompanied by 
psychologists attached to what has been labeled as 
Critical Social Psychology, whose work has opened 
up exciting debates in psychology and the social 
sciences. Although it is undeniable that such de-
bates have been, and continue to be, stimulating, 
sometimes the question emerges as to whether or 
not they have been, if I may say so, socially useful. In 
your most recent work you show a commitment to 
reducing such conflict. In fact, you have obviously 
worked hard to develop and promote ‘relational 
practices’ in fields such as organizational develop-
ment, conflict management, psychotherapy and 
education. Among the various practices that you 
have managed to know in depth, which one is, in 
your opinion, the most inspiring?
KJG: First off, I do share some doubt about 
the ultimate utility of critical work. Such work is 
absolutely essential in terms of bringing multiple 
voices into deliberation on the nature, purpose, 
and impact of science on society. However, there 
are ways in which the critical movement has proved 
divisive and succeeded in generating resistance as 
opposed to transformation. I think it is the kind of 
self-righteous, holier–than thou disposition that 
many critical theorists employ that is chiefly the 
problem. I say that as well from my own experience 
in working critically. So, in part what I am saying 
here is that if we are after social change, it may 
be more effective in the long run to develop and 
nourish the alternatives. When people see what is 
possible, when they see that they can participate, 
then you have set the fire for change. For me one of 
the most impressive examples is the way in which 
the movement in the social sciences in the US has 
virtually transformed entire areas of study. And 
this is not simply a movement from one form of 
positivism to another; rather, carried within the 
qualitative movement are fundamental challenges 
to the positivist understanding of science, and an 
invitation for bold new ventures in what qualifies 
as legitimate and effective science. I must also add 
that it is the qualitative movement in American 
psychology that has the most promising potential 
to generate the kind of change embraced by a con-
structionist epistemology.
JCA: Returning to your contact with Latin 
America, I would not like to miss the opportunity 
to ask you about the relational practices that are 
being developed there. The particularity of the so-
cial problems that South American countries are 
faced with and the wealth of critical thought and 
action that has characterized many of their social 
scientists, promise the emergence of practices that 
are in a way different from those you refer to in your 
works –practices that are more consistent with the 
lifestyle of the so-called ‘advanced countries’. Could 
you mention any original, relevant and appealing 
experiences in which we can find the germ of rela-
tional practices in Latin America?
KJG: I mentioned earlier that I always come 
away from my exchanges with Latin American col-
leagues deeply enriched. Let me here just mention 
some representative practices I have found inspir-
ing in last year’s travels to Brazil, Colombia, and 
Mexico. In Colombia I think of the work of Jeanette 
Samper and her colleagues. They are working with 
a hospital in Bogota where they are bringing into 
dialogue people from all parts of the hospital –doc-
tors, nurses, administrators, cleaning maids, and 
more– to talk about how they might work together 
to make the hospital a more humane care center. 
Then, in Mexico, there is the Kanankil Institute 
in Merida, where they have developed an exciting 
range of collaborative therapeutic practices. In fact, Social conStruction and relationaliSm: a converSation with Kenneth GerGen
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the Taos Institute will soon publish a book featur-
ing these various developments. I must mention 
the collaborations currently taking place between 
Dora Schnitman in Buenos Aires, Jorge Sanhueaza 
in Santiago, and half-a-dozen colleagues from Latin 
America and Spain, in launching international 
certificate programs in dialogic and collaborative 
practices.  I could go on to talk about so many 
other cases, and I have to tell you that I draw so 
much energy from these developments. Not only 
am I inspired by the creativity that is taking place 
everywhere, but I see the possibility of sharing such 
practices with the rest of the world, as examples of 
what is possible. The Taos Institute does its best to 
give these practices visibility. Much more needs to 
be done, but I do get a special thrill from thinking 
about the potential here for world change.
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